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1 Introduction
Twenty years ago scholars and practitioners of economic development paused to consider the
meaning of the ‘East Asian Miracle’ of rapid and inclusive economic growth. Standing in par-
ticularly sharp contrast to the miracle of East Asia was Latin America, described by some as mired
in a vicious circle of modest and exclusionary growth. While much was learned about the shared
growth policies that helped create inclusive development in East Asia, there was also a revisionist
reminder that policymaking is not cookery, and that recipes that worked in one locale will not be
replicated elsewhere by a set of disinterested chefs. In other words, the revisionist question was not
what was done differently in East Asia, but why did East Asian political actors choose differently
than those in Latin America.
This revisionist perspective retains its salience as we pause again, this time to consider the im-
plications of the East Asian experience for inclusive economic development in Africa. It remains
important to know the recipes for the policies that work, but it is also important to consider the po-
litical economy behind the choices made. Political choices reflect existing vested interests formed
by past allocations and commitments of resources. ‘What’s past is prologue’: the distribution of
resources and how resources are committed matter for policy outcomes. As such commitments are
made in expectation of political outcomes, it follows that inequality and the structure of economic
activity are dynamically intertwined with politics.
The political economy model that lies at the heart of our analysis is based on the idea that
public goods complement the productivity of private investment, especially for small and marginal
commercial producers. Government provision of these public goods not only increases growth
(by crowding-in private investment), it reduces inequality by creating broadly based or inclusive
growth, especially as it facilitates the transition of low wealth individuals from subsistence to more
remunerative commercial production. However, because the benefit of public goods varies by asset
level, so does the willingness to support public good provision through taxation. By modeling
endogenous production strategies around which political lobbies form, we show that the emergent
equilibrium policy is sensitive to the initial distribution of wealth.1 Wealth conditions not only
the set of voters in favor of public goods, but the strength of their preferences through campaign
contributions. For both these reasons, shared or inclusive growth policies are more likely under
lower inequality scenarios. In this setting, political equilibria which fail to provide any public
goods coincide with societies that fail to maintain a middle class. Conversely, societies with a
stronger incipient middle class capable of transitioning to commercial production will provide
more public goods. From this perspective, the extensive land reforms carried out in Japan, Korea
and Taiwan designed to create a prosperous class of commercially oriented farmers may have laid
1This can lead to multiple equilibria consisting of both low and high levels of public good provision. See Conny
Olovsson and Jesper Roine (2008) for a literature overview and an example in the case of public education.
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the foundation for future successes.2
While most academic discussion has long since moved away from understanding the East Asian
miracle and the foundations for inclusive growth, the remainder of this paper is dedicated to taking
seriously the suggestion that shared and inclusive growth requires that lower wealth agents be of
interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs. Thus, this paper models political economy in
the spirit of work such as Roemer (1982), Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) and Carter and Zimmerman
(2000) and thereby provides a complementary mechanism in ‘stagnation to growth’ stories of
development.3 Previous work has noted the crucial role of nonconvexities in accumulation and
the importance of different production modes (e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Galor et al. (2009)).
Distinct from previous work where inequality is mediated through labor or credit markets (see the
review of Matsuyama (2011)), here we focus on the mediating role of class based politics wherein
lobbies rather than individuals attempt to circumvent market imperfections.
While this inequality-centric model captures much of the earlier debate about Latin America
versus East Asia, agricultural risk–of the sort observed in large parts of Africa–operates much
like inequality. Risk and isolation can trap large numbers of households at low levels of income,
making them of little interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs. In this circumstance,
the latter have little to gain from offering policies designed to appeal to the trapped population.
Therefore even economies with relatively modest levels of asset inequality may operate like high
inequality Latin American economies, with politicians eschewing investment in shared growth-
promoting public goods in favor of other pathways to political power. This suggests an emphasis
on economic policies that break or relax the poverty trap logic, thereby changing the political
calculus in ways that would make inclusive growth policies more likely and self-sustaining.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisits the earlier East Asian
miracle debate. Section 3 lays out an economy in which voters endogenously adopt technology,
which determines their material interests in shared growth. Section 4 formalizes a political econ-
omy model that codifies insights that emerged from the debate about the impact of initial asset
inequality on endogenous policy choices. Section 5 considers the impact of isolation and risk on
policy choices and the potential for positive political externalities.
2 Vicious and Virtuous Circles of Economic Growth
The observation that East Asian economies simultaneously experienced rapid growth with low
and diminishing inequality provoked a rethinking of the linkages between growth and inequality.
The World Bank’s The East Asian Miracle (Page, 1994), as well as debates (Rodrik, 1994; Wade,
2For a detailed econometric analysis of the political consequences of land reform in Japan, see Kitamura (2013).
3Existing theories depict the role of technology, financial development, accumulation, institutional development
and evolving social preferences (Doepke and Zilibotti, 2005), and export led growth (Anders Akerman et al., 2013).
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2004), and follow-up work reported in Aoki et al. (1998), played important roles in sparking this
rethinking. The aptly named book, Beyond Tradeoffs: Market Reform and Equitable Growth in
Latin America, (Birdsall et al., 1998) emerged from this discussion and was intended to be a policy
primer to enable Latin American governments to emulate the inclusive growth patterns observed
in East Asia. This section first briefly reviews some of the macro-econometric evidence about
these linkages. We then turn to consider the microfoundations for such linkages, using them as a
springboard to launch a deeper exploration of the political economy of inclusive growth policies.
2.1 Macro Evidence of the Impact of Initial Inequality on Inclusive growth
In a provocative paper, Birdsall et al. (1995) employed cross-country data and showed that control-
ling for the level of per-capita GDP, aggregate human capital accumulation is enhanced by greater
income equality and its implied higher absolute incomes for the least well off members of a soci-
ety. In their interpretation, the rapid, inequality-reducing growth characteristic of the East Asian
experience was the product of a process in which low initial levels of inequality:
1. Enhance aggregate accumulation;
2. Increase the rate of economic growth; and,
3. Boost capital accumulation in lower wealth households, further decreasing inequality.
In other words, low initial inequality creates a virtuous circle of inclusive growth (Alesina and
Rodrik, 1994). Conversely, high inequality might create a vicious circle of exclusionary growth.
The suggestion that inequality conditions the distributional consequences of economic growth
received further support from studies of agricultural growth. A time series study by de Janvry and
Sadoulet (2000) finds that agrarian growth in Latin America is associated with sharply increasing
rural inequality. While we know of no similar study of East Asia, Ravallion and Datt (1995) find
that in India it is agrarian growth that is most strongly associated with reduced poverty and inequal-
ity. However, they also find that growth in Bihar—the Indian state with sharp, near Latin American
levels of land inequality—appears to contradict this general pattern. Perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the de Janvry and Sadoulet result is that they find that the association between agrarian
growth and increasing rural inequality has been even stronger in recent, post-liberalization growth
spells.4 Subsequent studies have found that rural exposure to liberalization may slow poverty
reduction and consumption growth (Topalova, 2010).
Finally, Carter (2004) employs mixed effects econometric methods to explore directly whether
initial land ownership inequality shifts the relationship between aggregate economic growth and
4While the estimated increase in inequality is not so sharp as to increase rural poverty in the wake of agrarian
growth, it has clearly blunted the potentially positive impact of growth on rural poverty, as they analyze in some detail.
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income distribution. Drawing on a standard decomposition of the Gini index, he shows that the
impact of agrarian inequality should dissipate over time (as the agricultural economy shrinks in
size) unless inequality has deeper structural effects on the income distribution consequences of
growth. The econometric results show that indeed agrarian inequality has a surprising legacy
effect that persists over time even as economies industrialize.
2.2 Microfoundations of Inclusive Growth
While this econometric evidence is telling, it does not identify the mechanisms linking initial
economic equality and inclusive growth. There is in fact no shortage of theoretical papers that es-
tablish foundations for that linkage. To pick one example that speaks directly to the Birdsall et al.
(1995) results, Ljungqvist (1993) explores how the absence of capital and insurance markets leads
poor people to under invest in human capital. Holding per-capita income constant, an increase in
inequality will push more people below the income threshold where human capital underinvest-
ment begins. Krebs (2003) further shows that these effects are large, to the extent that government
sponsored insurance is likely welfare improving, even if financed in a second-best fashion.
Similarly, there is a large literature that shows that imperfect rural financial markets can create
an economic dynamic that squeezes out low wealth producers.5 Similar to Lunqvist’s analysis,
increases in asset inequality that push more individuals beyond the reach of financial markets
implies a deepening pattern of exclusion.6 From these theoretical perspectives, the sensitivity of
the income distribution consequences of growth to initial inequality rests squarely on financial
market failures. The theories of credit rationing7 that explain these sorts of wealth biased financial
market failures are essentially saying that low wealth agents are of no interest to the economic
entrepreneurs on the supply side of financial markets. While this argument seems correct when
examined from the perspective of the high inequality economies of Latin America, it overlooks the
fact that in East Asia, governments undertook measures that bolstered the competitiveness of small
farm sector. A quick review shows that agricultural policy in Japan, Taiwan and Korea shows a
common emphasis on small farm credit, extension and price stabilization.8 These shared growth
policies reshaped markets in ways that enabled the small farm sector to flourish and underwrote an
inclusive growth strategy.9
5The dynamic stochastic programming analysis of Zimmerman and Carter (2003) shows how these missing markets
can create exclusionary patterns in which initial asset inequality deepens over time. Work on agricultural growth booms
in Latin America, summarized by Carter and Barham (1996), finds empirical evidence of many of these same patterns.
6The logic here is quite similar to more recent work on asset-based theories of poverty traps–see, for example,
Carter and Barrett (2006).
7See for example Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a general treatment of credit rationing, and Carter (1988) and
Boucher et al. (2007) for extensions and applications to rural financial markets.
8For a brief overview of rural and agricultural policy concerns and objectives, see Wye Group (2011).
9Indeed, even within highly advanced economies, the exclusion of farmers from agricultural support programs can
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These observations are consistent with those of Aoki et al. (1998) who took part in a broader
review of the East Asian miracle of inclusive growth. Like others writing in this area, these authors
note that East Asian governments engaged in a wide range of policies, which they describe as
“market enhancing,” meaning that the state carefully intervened in those realms where markets
work least well (e.g., providing capital and insurance), and by so doing enabled markets to then
effectively coordinate fundamental decisions of resource allocation and investment.
While others have noted this disciplined intervention of East Asian states, Aoki et al. (1998)
suggest a material explanation for this state behavior. Low levels of initial inequality (and a weak
elite) in East Asia implied that the only viable constituency for a government seeking political
support was a broadly-based one built around shared growth policies. Agricultural policy provides
one of the clearest examples of the endogeneity of a broadly-based or shared growth strategy to
low levels of initial inequality. Land reform in much of East Asia not only deeply redistributed
land ownership rights, but also imposed land ownership ceilings of only a few hectares. Aoki et al.
suggest that the absence of a strong rural elite deprived East Asian governments of a politically in-
fluential target group for the sorts of divisible and privately appropriable goods which governments
so often provision to develop the rural sector.10 Instead, policy focused on discovering and provid-
ing the key indivisible, quasi-public goods that markets were ill-conditioned to offer: goods which
are difficult to exclude (roads),11 that involve large fixed costs (dams, R&D),12 or face coordina-
tion problems (irrigation and sanitation systems)13. In addition, governments targeted institutional
innovations to open credit and insurance options. What other observers of East Asian agricultural
policy have attributed to an exogenous objective of shared growth (Tomich et al., 1995) is, in the
argument of Aoki et al., a product of low initial inequality operating through a political economy
circuit. The next section will model this political economy of shared growth policies, contrasting
between low and high inequality economies that has typified the discussion of East Asia versus
Latin America and rural Africa.
3 Asset Inequality and the Political Economy of Shared Growth
This section offers our core economic model designed to shed light on the economic and politi-
cal forces that determine whether governments choose to provide tax-financed public goods that
complement private investment, or whether they choose a low tax rate regime which allows indi-
cause rapid and drastic exit from commercial production (Tadlock Cowan and Jody Feder, 2012).
10E.g. subsidized credit, machinery subsidies, investment credits, etc.
11When geographically separate ethnic concentrations make roads functionally excludable, public investment is
likely misallocated as Burgess et al. (2013) find.
12Dams also present coordination issues due to the redistributional pattern of downstream winners and local losers
(Duflo and Pande, 2007).
13The extent of such coordination problems may be exacerbated by agroecological conditions (Wade, 1988).
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viduals to enjoy more private goods. The implicit underlying role of public good provision can
be thought of as a second-best policy which encourages high productivity activities when incom-
plete financial markets otherwise constrain agents, thus generating inclusive growth.14 Under our
model, the complementary value of public goods depends on an individual’s wealth, which implies
heterogeneous preferences for the level of public good expenditure. In particular, public goods are
especially valuable for those enabled to transition from subsistence to commercial production.15
Because the economic valuation of public goods varies across voters, politics will matter for the
choice of policy in potentially interesting ways.
After laying out the setting, this section establishes endogenous class formation in response to
economic incentives and public good provision, and then considers voters’ political preferences.
3.1 Investment, Production and Consumption
We consider a society comprised of a unit mass of voters who live two periods. Politically, each
individual is endowed with one vote. Economically, each individual i enjoys an initial wealth
endowment, Ai, where A(i) denotes the distribution of wealth in period 0. Before considering
how the overall society operates, and how its operation is influenced by inequality, we need to first
characterize economic behavior and political preferences along the wealth continuum.
To generate income, each individual has access to two capital dependent technologies: a sub-
sistence technology, and a higher yielding commercial technology that depends on both public and
private capital. Wealth Bi invested in the subsistence technology generates returns at a constant
rate r, generating an income flow of rBi.
Wealth not allocated to the subsistence technology can be allocated to the commercial technol-
ogy F which generates an income stream given by:
F (Ki,κi) = θ (Kαi /2+κ
α
i /2)
1/α with α,θ ∈ (0,1) ,
where Ki is private capital, while κi is a quasi-public capital good that is complementary to private
capital in production. Use of the commercial technology requires payment of a fixed, start-up cost
of cF . We additionally assume θ > 21/αr, so that once cF is paid, investments Ki always dominate
the subsistence technology.16 As a quasi-public good, κi can be provided both publicly (P) and
14Note that the core model here is a two-period poverty trap model. Subsistence Producers are trapped at a low level
of well-being by the combination of their own initial asset level and their inability to borrow from others.
15In this sense, we provide a microeconomic foundation for the G and K phases of rapid economic development as
laid out by Chapter 1 of Aoki et al. (2012).
16To see this, note that the marginal investment product of F is (θ/2)Kα−1i (K
α
i /2+κ
α
i /2)
1/α−1 ≥ θ2−1/α > r.
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privately (Pi) so that individual i has access to:
κi = P+Pi.
However, private provision of the quasi-public good incurs an additional fixed cost, cP, reflecting
the difficulty of private actors to both construct and ‘fence in’ these quasi-public goods.17 The
relationship of these production strategies to fixed costs are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Fixed Costs and Production Strategies
Figure 2: Production Technologies and Inter-temporal Trade-Offs
(a) Production Regimes (b) Inter-temporal Consumption by Type
The solid lines in Figure 2a illustrate these two different production technologies. The F(Ki,P)
curve is drawn for a given level of the public good P, assuming no private provisioning of this
good (Pi = 0). Increases in P and the level of the public good will complement and increase the
productivity of private capital. Thus, the public provision of P is a shared or inclusive growth policy
as investments in P not only boost the productivity of all individuals who employ the commercial
17We interpret public provision of the quasi-public good P as non-rivalrous, but private enhancements Pi as poten-
tially rivalrous, thus incurring costs to ensure private access.
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technology, but also opens a door of upward mobility for some individuals who would otherwise
find themselves using only the subsistence technology.
Given these production possibilities, agents make their production choices in order to maximize
their two period utility, discounted at rate β = (1+ r)−1:
[
log
(
c0i
)
+β log
(
c1i
)]
/(1+β ) . (1)
The budget constraints faced by each voter across periods are given by
c0i ≤ Ai−Ki−Bi−Pi− cF ·1Ki>0− cP ·1Pi>0, (2)
c1i ≤ F (Ki,κi)+Ki+Pi+(1+ r)Bi,
where 1Ki>0 and 1Pi>0 are the binary indicator variables that take the value of one when when
the agent respectively invests in Ki and Pi and must pay the fixed costs cF and cP. Note that
an individual’s initial wealth endowment needs to fund both period 0 consumption and capital
allocated to produce income for period 1. Period 1 consumption is then the income flows generated
plus assets retained. Finally, agents cannot borrow, and hence the additional constraints that:
Bi,Ki,Pi ≥ 0. (3)
Letting c˜0i and c˜
1
i denote the values of consumption that maximize (1) subject to (2)-(3), we
denote an agent’s welfare after making investment and consumption decisions as
U (Ai,P)≡max
c0i ,c
1
i
[
log
(
c0i
)
+β log
(
c1i
)]
/(1+β )= log c˜0i
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)1/(2+r)
.
3.2 Economic Classes as Endowment-necessitated Behavior
The model outlined in the prior section leads to three possible livelihood strategies or potential
economic classes defined by the inequality constraints in (3):18
1. Subsistence Producers (Bi > 0,Ki = 0,Pi = 0). These individuals, whom we would expect
to be at the bottom of the asset distribution, will not pay cF nor cP and optimally choose
Bi = Ai/(2+ r) and c˜0i = c˜
1
i = (1+ r)Ai/(2+ r). The first order condition for Bi implies
c1i = c
0
i , so each voter’s inter-temporal allocation of assets must satisfy Bi = Ai/(2+ r).
Consequently, the welfare of a Subsistence Producer, denoted US (Ai,P), is given by
US (Ai,P) = log((1+ r)Ai/(2+ r)) .
18Note that certain possible classes, e.g. Bi,Ki > 0, are ruled out by technology assumptions.
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2. Petty Commercial Producers (Bi = 0,Ki > 0,Pi = 0) rely on existing public goods. These
agents pay cF to produce, using investments Ki in the high productivity technology F . The
first order condition for Ki implies each voter’s inter-temporal allocation of assets satisfies
c˜0i = Ai−Ki− cF , c˜1i = F (Ki,P)+Ki, c˜1i /(1+∂F/∂Ki) = c˜0i /(1+ r) . (4)
Consequently, Ki is fixed by (4) and the welfare of a Petty Producer, UP (Ai,P), is
UP (Ai,P) = log(Ai−Ki− cF) [(1+∂F/∂Ki)/(1+ r)]1/(2+r) .
3. Large Commercial Producers (Bi = 0,Ki > 0,Pi > 0) who self-provide complementary
production goods Pi for their private use by paying cF and cP. These individuals supplement
existing public goods until the returns from investments and public goods are equated at
Pi = Ki−P. The first order conditions for Ki and Pi imply each individual’s inter-temporal
allocation of assets must satisfy
c˜0i = Ai−2Ki+P− cF − cP, c˜1i = (θ +2)Ki−P, c˜1i /(1+θ/2) = c˜0i /(1+ r) .
This implies investments are fixed by
Ki = [(Ai− cF − cP)(1+θ/2)+(2+ r+θ/2)P]/(2+ r)(2+θ) .
Under this allocation, returns to additional assets become linear as shown in Figure 3a. The
welfare of a Large Commercial Producer, UL (Ai,P), is
UL (Ai,P) = log
(
(1+ r)(1+θ/2)(Ai− cF − cP)+ r (θ/2)P
(2+ r)(1+θ/2)
)(
1+θ/2
1+ r
)−(1+r)/(2+r)
.
Looking across these three potential economic classes, we see that returns to wealth invested in
production increase as we move from the Subsistence to the Petty Commercial to the Large Com-
mercial strategies. The marginal returns provided by productive investments are summarized by
the rate at which voters are willing to trade off present for future consumption. Comparing the
three regimes, we see that inter-temporal consumption patterns satisfy the following:
Subsistence :
c˜1i
c˜0i
= 1, Petty :
c˜1i
c˜0i
=
1+∂F/∂Ki
1+ r
, Large :
c˜1i
c˜0i
=
1+θ/2
1+ r
. (5)
Figure 2b graphs these marginal returns to investment for each class.
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These inter-temporal trade-offs determine the marginal welfare of assets and public goods. To
see this, consider the welfare transformation exp(U (Ai,P)) and note that for any economic class,
∂ exp(U (Ai,P))/∂Ai = (1+ r)/(2+ r) ·
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)1/(2+r)
. (6)
Combining Equations (5) and (6) shows that the graphs of exp(U (Ai,P)) would appear much as
in Figure 2a. As assets increase, producers initially receive low returns from subsistence, achieve
accelerated gains as Petty producers, and at the highest asset levels receive the greatest returns.
For any fixed set of Subsistence, Petty and Large producers, increases in public goods increase
the average growth rate E
[(
c˜1i − c˜0i
)
/c˜0i
]
. This occurs through an intensive margin, by which pro-
ducers further delay consumption, and can be understood through the intertemporal consumption
ratios of Equation (5). There it is clear that changes in public goods do not affect Subsistence or
Large producers. Simultaneously, increases in public goods decrease investments Ki for Petty pro-
ducers while augmenting the productivity of investments, and both factors increase the marginal
product of capital and thus c˜1i /c˜
0
i . This implication is summarized as Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For any fixed set of Subsistence, Petty and Large producers, increases in public
goods increase the growth rate.
However, changes in public good provision also induce producers to adopt different production
strategies, which we now examine.
3.3 Public Goods and the Creation of a Middle Class
While all agents would in principle prefer the higher returns and welfare associated with the higher
strategy classes, two forces block them. First, fixed costs prevent lower wealth individuals from
self-financing the higher return technologies. Second, borrowing constraints prevent those same
low wealth individuals from using other’s wealth to reach the larger scales required to reap the
higher returns. Thus, an individual’s position in the endowment continuum conditions his or
her constrained optimal choice of production strategy. However, the provision of public goods
improves productive possibilities and thus alters optimal strategies. More formally, the welfare
impact of public good provision is stark across classes since
∂ exp(U (Ai,P))/∂P = (∂F/∂P)/(2+ r) ·
(
c˜1i /c˜
0
i
)−(1+r)/(2+r)
.
Thus, Subsistence producers who do not use the production technology F have d exp(US)/dP= 0,
while the welfare of Commercial producers increases. This implies that when public goods in-
crease, the set of Commercial producers expands at the expense of Subsistence producers. Equa-
tion (7) computes the value of public goods across Commercial producers. Large producers can
10
fluidly move investments across periods, so absorb public goods as to achieve a return of θ/2 in
period 1, while Petty producers are constrained and achieve a return of ∂F/∂P.
∂ expUL
∂P
=
θ/2
2+ r
(
1+ r
1+θ/2
)(1+r)/(2+r)
,
∂ expUP
∂P
=
∂F/∂P
2+ r
(
1+ r
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)(1+r)/(2+r)
. (7)
For a producer indifferent between Petty and Large production, Petty production implies saving on
fixed costs cP to ‘over invest’ until Ki >P. With (7), this shows ∂ exp(UP)/∂P> ∂ exp(UL)/∂P.19
Therefore increases in public goods will enlarge the Petty commercial class at the expense of the
Large Commercial class, as depicted in Figure 3a.20 In summary, we have:
Proposition 2. Costless increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial class relative to
Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Figure 3: Public Goods and Class
(a) Public Goods and Class Formation (b) Numerical Production Regimes
We also claim that, absent any restrictions on the range of initial assets, the economy will
exhibit all three classes when sufficient public goods are provided. First, subsistence is always
chosen by those with insufficient assets to join the Commercial classes. Second, as P grows large,
any producer with the assets cF to join the Commercial classes would be rewarded with high
consumption in period 1, justifying any amount of low consumption in period 0. Third, producers
with assets in [cF ,cP) can afford to become Petty but cannot afford to become Large. Finally, for
19Formally, because this implies that ∂F/∂P > θ/2 > ∂F/∂Ki for this indifferent producer.
20The dashed line of the Figure represents the assets of a producer indifferent between Petty and Large classes.
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any fixed level of public goods, the higher asset returns of the Large commercial class are always
rational provided sufficiently high initial assets.21 Proposition 3 summarizes this argument.
Proposition 3. Provided initial assets range from zero to infinity, economies with sufficiently high
levels of public goods will exhibit all three classes. A sufficient level of public goods is
1+
cF
P
≤ (1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
[
2+ r
1+ r
[
1+θ/2
1+ r
]1/(2+r)
−1
]
. (8)
Proof. See Appendix.
Finally, the adoption of technology as assets range from zero to infinity can be seen by combin-
ing Propositions 2 and 3. At high levels of public goods, there are three endogenously determined
groups of Subsistence, Petty Commodity and Large-scale producers as in Figure 3a. At low asset
levels (Ai ≤ AP), producers choose Subsistence, while for high asset levels (AL ≤ Ai), producers
join the Large commercial class. Intermediate asset levels (AP ≤ Ai ≤ AL) correspond to Petty
commercial production. These three endogenously determined groups of Subsistence, Petty Com-
modity and Large-scale producers have respective population shares
σS ≡ A(AP) , σP ≡ A(AL)−A(AP) , σL ≡ 1−A(AL) . (9)
It is of course possible that there may be no members of any particular class, as would happen,
for example, if no agent enjoys wealth in excess of AL. Using the numerical assumptions detailed in
the appendix, Figure 3b illustrates class boundaries for different levels of public goods. Individuals
whose initial wealth places them to the southwest of the solid line will optimally choose to employ
the subsistence technology. Those to the northwest of the dashed line will optimally invest in
privately provisioned public goods and join the Large Commercial class. Finally, those between
the solid and dashed lines will be in Petty Commercial Producer class. As can be seen, as the level
of public goods increases, the initial wealth level needed to exit Subsistence and join the Petty
Commercial class drops off quickly.
We can represent a particular society as in Figure 4. The horizontal axis represents the wealth
continuum along which individuals are distributed. The vertical axis represents the cumulative
distribution of individuals. The solid line represents a society with a more egalitarian initial wealth
distribution, while the dashed curve represents a less egalitarian society, but with the same mean
level of wealth. In Figure 4, we can see that in the absence of public goods, approximately 80%
of the high inequality population will be in the Subsistence class, with the remainder in the Large
producer class. However, more than 80% of all wealth will be controlled by the large producer
21Formally, limAi→∞ d [exp(UL)− exp(US)]/dAi ≥
[
(1+θ/2)1/(2+r)− (1+θ2−1/α)1/(2+r)]/(2+ r)> 0.
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class. In contrast, in the low inequality economy, the absence of public goods would imply all
individuals and all wealth will be in the Subsistence class.
Figure 4: High and Low Inequality Asset Distributions
3.4 Public Policy and Political Interests
We now consider individuals’ preferences for government action. While government provision of
public goods provides a benefit to all (incipient) commercial producers, a key political question is
for whom this benefit is worth the cost. To explore this question, we need to first specify a model
of public finance that defines the government’s budget constraint. We restrict our attention to the
simple case in which the government taxes assets at a flat rate τ , or does not tax, thereby directly
increasing individuals’ private assets.22 Average wealth in the economy is µ ≡ ∫ AidA(i) so that
the total tax raised to provide public goods is τµ . As mentioned above, the provision of public
goods is a shared growth policy in the sense that it provides a benefit to all commercial producers.
It is also an inclusive growth policy as it reduces the critical initial wealth threshold, AP, allowing
more individuals to graduate from subsistence to petty commercial production.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that Large Commercial producers are the sole participants
in domestic financial markets. The resulting equilibrium interest rate of θ/2 reflects that for these
individuals, both investments and public goods yield a one period total return of 1+ θ/2. Thus,
the government may borrow at interest rate θ/2 to purchase P units of the public good. We assume
that everyone in society receives an equal per-capita share of the total public goods provided.23 To
cover the interest on this debt, the government raises taxes τµ in period 0 and saves them for a
22More complex tax regimes would certainly influence political outcomes. Following the analysis below, progres-
sive schemes would further antagonize Large producer support for public goods, while driving up the benefit of public
goods to Petty producers thus increasing their support for public goods.
23This is P as society is comprised of a unit mass of individuals.
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total return of (1+θ/2)τµ in period 1 to service the debt. This implies the level of public good
provision must satisfy the inter-temporal budget constraint
Government Budget Constraint : (1+θ/2)τµ = (1+θ/2)P−P, (10)
This budget constraint reflects the fact that the government can save collected taxes τµ for one
period and use its total budget to pay the debt service.24
We now consider the competing effects of taxation and public good provision on well-being
across economic classes. The total effects of government policy for any Commercial class are25
dU/dτ = (1+θ/2)µ/(θ/2) ·∂U/∂P−Ai ·dU/dAi. (11)
Equation (11) sets the beneficial effect of public good provision against the detrimental costs of
taxation, and characterizes the policy regime that each individual would support politically.
For Subsistence Producers, the lack of access to the production technology F implies ∂U/∂P=
0, so they pay taxes with no hope of compensation and would prefer that no taxes are levied. At
the other extreme, members of the Large Commercial class are free to reduce Pi to offset increases
in P, so they are immune to ‘forced purchase’ of public goods. Therefore a Large Commercial
Producer’s welfare increases in τ so long as the tax paid, τAi is less than the discounted value of
public goods provided in period 1, so Equation (11) becomes26
dUL/dτ = (µ−Ai) ·dUL/dAi. (12)
Equation (12) shows members of the Large Commercial class prefer higher taxes only when their
assets are below average, so for this class, taxes are purely redistributive. Clearly then, the wealth-
iest members of the society will oppose the taxation needed for a shared growth policy.
Finally, for Petty Commercial Producers, Equation (11) can be written
dUP/dτ =
 µ−Ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
Redistributive
+
[
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+∂F/∂Ki
−1
]
µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit of Public Goods
 ·dUP/dAi.
Decomposing this equation shows that Petty producers are motivated by both redistributive con-
24The rationale for modeling public good provision at a one period ‘rental’ is in keeping with longer horizon models
in which a government would own public goods but amortize their cost over several periods.
25An increase in taxes τ decreases available assets at rate Ai, as ∂U/∂τ|P fixed = −Ai · dU/dAi, so the impact of
taxation is known from (6) above. Conversely, an increase in τ provides public goods to all voters at rate P/τ =
(1+ θ/2)µ/θ/2, which implies ∂U/∂τ|(1−τ)Ai fixed = (1+θ/2)µ/(θ/2) ·dU/dP.
26Formally, the envelope theorem shows that ∂U/∂P = ((∂F/∂P)/(2+ r)) · (c˜0i /c˜1i ) ·dU/dAi.
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cerns and the productive benefits of public goods. For a Petty producer who happens to equate
the marginal product of private and public investments (Ki = P), the benefit term above vanishes
as for Large producers.27 Petty producers with more assets increase private investment, making
the benefit term positive, since the potential return of public goods to such producers is higher
than the opportunity cost of providing public goods, θ/2. Similarly, Petty producers with fewer
assets achieve returns on public goods below θ/2, yielding a negative benefit term. Ultimately, the
combined effects are positive so long as taxes aren’t prohibitively high.28
Informed by this analysis, we restrict τ to moderate levels in order to analyze economies where
public goods have some positive benefit for Petty producers, i.e. that taxes have not immiserated
producers into highly unproductive behaviors, as laid in Assumption 1. Conditions 1 and 2 of this
assumption means that the class boundaries above do not violate producers ability to pay for their
preferred class plus a small margin, and in order to be violated, taxes have to approach 1/(2+ r),
i.e. almost 50% at standard discount rates. For condition 3 to be violated at tax rates below 50%
would require extremely high marginal returns to public goods of over 200%.
Assumption 1. Moderate taxation.
1. (1− τ)AP− cF > (1+ r)τAP.
2. (1− τ)AL− cP > 0.
3. 1− ∂F/∂P|Ai=AL /4≥ τ .
Under moderate taxation, all Petty producers receive positive marginal benefits from increased
taxation. We summarize these political interests as
Proposition 4. The political interests of Large producers are purely redistributive, while Petty
producers care also about the productive benefits of public goods. Under moderate taxation:
1. dUL/dτ ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ Ai.
2. dUP/dτ ≥ 0 for all Ai ≥ AP.
Proof. See Appendix.
While we have seen that costless increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial class,
the introduction of taxes to pay for public goods introduces income effects which might also shrink
this class. However, at moderate tax rates, the productive benefits of publicly augmenting private
investments dominate income effects, as summarized in Proposition 5:
27The condition of Proposition 3 guarantees this Petty producer exists.
28While the costless provision of public goods enlarges the Petty Commercial class, the taxation required for these
goods drains producers of wealth, potentially disincentivizing high return production. The most obvious way this
might occur is under prohibitively high taxes which preclude producers from paying the fixed costs of adoption. For
example, at a 100% taxation rate, all producers are immiserated to subsistence by the lack of assets to pay cF .
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Proposition 5. Under moderate taxation, increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial
class relative to Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Proof. See Appendix.
Until now, we have exogenously modeled public good provision. We now model public goods
as the outcome of a political contest between parties who are lobbied along class lines.
4 Political Parties and Electoral Competition
To explore the politics of policy choice, we assume a two-party political system. Voters involved
in the commercial economy are informed and tend to vote and lobby for their economic interest.
Non-commercial subsistence producers are uninformed as public goods are meaningless to them.29
All voters have random political preferences that make them more likely to vote for one of the two
political parties. Uninformed voters are further swayed by political expenditures made by the
parties. In our modeling, we pay particular attention to each agent’s constrained willingness to pay
for a particular policy. We then explore the suggestion that the extent of initial asset inequality and
risk will fundamentally shape whether the political-economic processes will result in the choice of
shared growth policies.
In this section, we lay out the elements for a model of electoral competition. We then establish
the behavior of political parties and analyze the resulting political-economic equilibrium.
4.1 Parties, Lobbies and Elections
We assume there are two political parties, Reds (R) and Greens (G). Parties are office motivated
and offer platforms (τR,PR) and (τG,PG) composed of a flat income tax τ used to finance public
goods P through (10).30 Voters have idiosyncratic preferences δi in favor of party R, distributed
uniformly over [−1/2ψ,1/2ψ]. Petty and Large Commercial producers are informed voters who
vote on the basis of economic policy. The welfare of an informed voter i under a platform (τ,P) is
U ((1− τ)Ai,P)+δi ·1R elected.
29Similar to Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000), this implies that the share of informed voters increases with wealth.
Our more stark assumption that the poorest voters are completely uninformed is to allow for the added complexity of
endogenous interest group formation.
30We abstract from factors that might influence the application of taxes towards public good provision, such as
government leakages or the capacity of politicians to effectively provide public goods once funds are allocated. The
role of these factors when local politics are distinct or fractionalized is an area for further work (Gehlbach, 2006).
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Therefore informed voters prefer a Red party platform in preference to a Green platform whenever
U ((1− τR)Ai,PR)+δi ≥U ((1− τG)Ai,PG) .
Subsistence producers are uninformed voters who are influenced by campaign contributions CR
and CG, and vote for the Red party whenever
CR+δi ≥CG.
Given party platforms and campaign contributions, the probability that Red party is elected (ρ) is:
ρ = 1/2+ψ
∫
Ai≥AP
[U ((1− τR)Ai,PR)−U ((1− τG)Ai,PG)]dA(i)+ψ
∫
Ai<AP
[CR−CG]dA(i) .
Once parties have chosen platforms to maximize their election chances, lobbies representing each
group of commercial producers make campaign contributions to support their preferred party.
With these building blocks, we take a standard approach and model the behavior of class-based
lobbies, where each lobby maximizes the welfare of its constituency less a quadratic loss function
associated with the per capita costs of raising political contributions from its members.31 As is
well known in this setting, (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Gehlbach, 2013), in equilibrium each
party selects the same platform and no contributions are made. Equilibrium platforms coincide
with the solution to a weighted sum of Petty and Large Commercial Producer welfare:
max
(τ,P)
(
σL+ψσ2L
)
EA [UL|Ai > AL]+
(
σP+ψσ2P
)
EA [UP|AL > Ai > AP] subject to (10). (13)
In summary, the timing of a political-economic cycle is as follows:
1. Voters choose their class, contingent on a rational expectation of political outcomes.
2. Parties propose platforms, maximizing their probability of being elected.
3. Commercial lobbies contribute to campaigns to maximize constituent welfare.
4. Voters elect parties and the winner’s platform is implemented.
5. Voters choose their flexible investments and produce.
31For example, the lobby for the Large Commercial class would pick a contribution level to maximize∫ ∞
AL
[
ρU ((1− τR)Ai,PR)+(1−ρ)U ((1− τG)Ai,PG)− ((CR+CG)/σL)2 /2
]
dA(i) .
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Expectations of low public good provision lead to an anemic Petty class, while high expectations
crowd in Petty producers who enforce high public good levels politically. These possibilities are
better understood by examining the necessary conditions for political equilibria of Equation (14):
−(1+ψσL)
∫ ∞
AL
(dUL/dτ)dA(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Cost of τ to Large Commercial Producers
≥ (1+ψσP)
∫ AL
AP
(dUP/dτ)dA(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Benefit of τ to Petty Commercial Producers
. (14)
When the marginal cost to Large producers is strictly larger than the marginal benefit to Petty
producers, the Petty class does not exist. This is because strict inequality in Equation (14) can only
occur at the ‘corner equilibrium’ of no public good provision, in which case the marginal benefit
of public goods to Petty producers is infinite. This yields Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. The only class structure compatible with no public good provision is an economy
composed solely of Subsistence and Large Commercial Producers.
These results show that the strength of a class to pursue its interests in the political arena depend
on the fixed investments voters make. Since investments in turn depend on the expected level of
public goods provided by politicians, good and bad expectations can lead to inclusive or exclusive
policies. We now address these outcomes by investigating voter interests as class strength changes.
4.2 Inequality and Public Good Provision
In light of Propositions 4 and 6, at any interior equilibrium, Equation (14) can be written as
0 = (1+ψσL)
∫ ∞
max{AL,µ}
(dUL/dτ)dA(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(−)
+(1+ψσL)
∫ max{AL,µ}
AL
(dUL/dτ)dA(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+(1+ψσP)
∫ AL
AP
(dUP/dτ)dA(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
. (15)
The initial distribution of assets impacts public good provision through Equation (15). In partic-
ular, consider an economy with asset distribution A and equilibrium tax rate τ1. Now consider a
second economy with identical productive features, but an asset distribution B which results from
redistributing from rich to poor voters that increases the size of the (incipient) Petty class.32 In this
second economy, Equation (15) must be positive at tax rate τ1. As (15) decreases in τ for any fixed
set of producers under moderate taxation (see Appendix), it follows that a B distribution economy
32Formally, B has fewer voters at every level of assets above max
{
A1L,µ
}
and more voters at every level of assets
in
(
A1P,max
{
A1L,µ
})
.
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has a higher equilibrium tax rate. This result, linking the relative strength of Petty producers more
equal economies to increased public goods is summarized as Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under moderate taxation, economies with a stronger incipient Petty class have
higher levels of public goods.
Risk may also prevent voters from adopting higher productivity technologies and thereby re-
duces the size of the incipient Petty class. Thus, reducing risk may in fact crowd in public goods,
which we now explain.
4.3 Risk and Public Good Provision
In order to model high yielding technologies which may entail risk, suppose that commercial pro-
duction yields variable total returns of [F (Ki,κi)+Ki+Pi] · εi where εi is randomly distributed
with E [εi] = 1 and support on
[
θ2−1/α − r,∞
)
. This implies commercial production always yields
higher returns than subsistence, but risk as measured by ρ ≡ |E [lnεi]| makes Commercial produc-
tion less rewarding. Increases in risk ρ do not change the relative attractiveness of Petty versus
Large Commercial production across asset levels, but risk does make Subsistence more appealing
than Commercial production, increasing AP and shrinking the Petty class. Following the logic
above through Equation (15), decreases in risk thereby again crowds in political capital in support
of public goods, summarized as Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Under moderate taxation, economies with less risk have higher levels of public
goods.
We next illustrate the mechanisms of the formal results with a numerical example to fix ideas.
4.4 Endogenous Class and Willingness to Pay for Public Policy
In an effort to understand agent’s potential budget-constrained willingness to make political con-
tributions, we perform the following thought experiment:
• The Red party offers a status quo of PR = 0, while the Green party offers a reform of PG > 0.
• The Green party accountants calculate how much initial wealth each voter would be willing
to give up in order to obtain (or avoid) the reform policy with probability one.
These amounts calculated can be considered as upper bound estimates of the amount of political
contributions the reformist Green party could collect. While individuals would likely contribute
less than this upper-bound estimate (given electoral uncertainty, among other things), these esti-
mates do provide a window into the interaction between politics and economics.
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Figure 5 displays the percentage of initial wealth that an individual could pay to their preferred
political party without making themselves worse off compared to the policy of their non-preferred
party. For example, at P = 50 on the horizontal axis, a voter willing to contribute 5% of their
wealth would be indifferent between (i) a 5% contribution plus implementation of P = 50 and (ii)
the status quo (P= 0). Asset positions that show negative amounts means that the individual could
contribute that amount to secure a status quo, Red Party win.
Figure 5: Upper Bound Estimates of Political Willingness to Pay
As can be appreciated in Figure 5, the strongest potential support for reform policies emerge
from what might be termed the incipient petty commercial class. Note that at low levels of public
good provision, voters with wealth levels of between 200 and 600 optimally pursue the subsis-
tence strategy. At those modest wealth levels, it never makes economic sense for them to pursue
commercial production. However, if the government delivers roughly 20 units of public good or
more, then individuals at this wealth level optimally transition to the petty commercial class. These
incipient Petty producers would become informed and be able to contribute positive, but modest
amounts of their wealth to insure the election of a reform policy. The willingness to pay of this
group increases up until public good levels of at least 70 units.
Notably, such endogenous support for public goods ‘led by the middle class’ means that the
distribution and provision of public goods are not independent. For example, for a fixed govern-
ment budget the distribution of public goods might fail anti-poverty objectives (as in Bardhan and
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Mookherjee, 2006), but the size of the budget may be in proportion to the political strength of Petty
producers. When the economic environment is constrained by such political realities, the policies
which maximally reduce poverty may be those which form common cause with other groups, as
this ‘imprecise targeting’ is precisely what garners political capital.
From an informed voter perspective, with P = 0, individuals with wealth in excess of about
600 units would provide their own public goods (Pi > 0), pursuing the large scale commercial
strategy. However, because these individuals are all above the mean wealth level in the economy
(µ = 260 in the numerical example), they strictly lose from the implementation of a reform policy.
While a further exposition of the contest between parties is laid out in Appendix C, we now turn
to equilibrium outcomes.
4.5 Political Poverty Traps and Endogenous Class Formation
Finally, combining these different class interests across promised public good levels yields Figures
6a and 6b. The horizontal axis of these Figures contains the expected level of public goods voters
credibly might expect, while the vertical axis plots the level of public goods that are the political
outcome when voters invest based on expectations.
(a) High Asset Inequality (b) Low Asset Inequality
Figure 6: Political-Economic Equilibria
Figure 6a depicts a low public good equilibrium at P = 0 wherein a weak Petty Commercial
Class (see Figure 3b) cannot obtain any positive level of public goods from the government. The
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same Figure also depicts a high public good equilibrium at P ≈ 75 where an incipient middle
class, formed by expectations of high public good provision can ensure this level of public goods
politically. Here the political poverty trap is evident: sustaining a low to moderate level of public
goods can make Petty producers of sufficient interest to political entrepreneurs to pursue a high
level of public goods in equilibrium. In contrast, the low asset inequality economy of Figure 6b
has a unique equilibrium of high public good provision as the high asset interest groups which act
against the taxation that public goods entail are considerably weaker.33
The potential for no public good provision (a la Proposition 6) can be clearly seen in the high
inequality economy of Figure 6a. In contrast, the economy of Figure 6b consists solely of Subsis-
tence and Petty producers. These dominant Petty producers maximize their average class welfare
by setting the RHS of Equation (14) to zero, achieving a high level of public good provision in
equilibrium.
More broadly, this political poverty trap can be broken when political parties can credibly
promise to deliver public goods, which brings voters into the Petty commercial class and crowds in
both physical and political capital to support inclusive growth. This relationship is depicted in both
Figure 6a and Figure 6b, which show that the level of public goods provided by political contests
increase as voters come to expect them. This occurs when there are sufficient Petty producers
(measured by σP) who receive high benefits of taxation (measured by dUP/dτ|Ai=AL) relative to
Large producers. Formally,
σP · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > σL · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL . (16)
Equation (16) means that when considering the benefits of taxation to a voter indifferent between
Petty and Large production, the benefit to Petty production weighted by the mass of Petty producers
is larger than the corresponding quantity for Large production. In summary, we have
Proposition 9. Under moderate taxation and (16), increases in expected public goods crowd in
delivered public goods.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now briefly discuss the role of risk which is endemic to small entrepreneurs in developing
countries and crucially shapes their economic lives. In this framework, risk alters production
strategies which in turn informs the political interests of producers. Thus, risk has spillover effects
on the national development strategy akin to the role of initial inequality.
33As is common in models of political public good provision, the conditions which pin down the number and
particular properties of equilibria are highly endogenous, e.g. Benabou (2000).
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5 Viable Producers as the Foundation for Inclusive Growth
While highly stylized, our political economy model implies that in the presence of high levels of
risk, the kinds of shared growth policies that underwrote the rural foundations of the East Asian
miracle are not politically viable, even in economies with modest levels of asset inequality. Before
turning to consider what might be done to rectify that situation, it is important to recall that the
model itself rests on an assumption of financial market failure. Formally, it is the inability of low
wealth agents to borrow large amounts of resources that keep them from leapfrogging from the
subsistence to the petty commercial class and higher rates of returns to the assets that they own.34
While this assumption seems reasonable, it is essentially a statement that low wealth agents are of
no more interest to economic entrepreneurs than they are to political entrepreneurs. As exhibited in
the last section, risk plays a key role in this exclusionary process, and reductions in risk may have
political knock on effects. We now speculate on the policy implications of our political economy
framework for the likelihood that polities might support and sustain inclusive growth policies,
taking Africa as an example.
5.1 The Political Ramifications of Risk in Africa
Risk plays an important part in explaining rural financial market failures. Only a tiny fraction
of agricultural land in sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated, in sharp contrast to other world regions.35
While the absence of irrigation reduces productivity, it also has a large impact on the risk to which
farmers are exposed. In an analysis of West Africa, Carter (1997) documents the magnitude of
this risk, showing not only that is larger than other world regions, but also that if left unmanaged
exposes households to huge consumption risk. Households of course do manage that risk, but often
by avoiding higher yielding, but risky and more expensive technologies.
Should the higher yielding technology exhibit risk in the model above, investment incentives to
abandon subsistence would be reduced as agents would be tempted to consume more in the initial
period rather than risking resources in investment projects which perhaps do not pay off. As shown
in Figure (3ab), it is this class that sacrifices the most to invest by having already precariously low
period 0 consumption. In addition, as already demonstrated in dynamic poverty trap models, an
increase in risk pushes out the initial asset level at which individuals will attempt the transition
from a low-level equilibrium strategy to a higher level equilibrium strategy.36
34Our model shares this characteristic with the general category of multiple equilibrium poverty trap models ana-
lyzed by Barrett and Carter (2013).
35The 2008 World Development Report indicates that less than 5% of land is irrigated in Africa, compared to 39%
in South Asia and 29% in East Asia.
36E.g. in the frame work of Carter and Ikegami (2009), this impact appears as a shift out in what they call the Mi-
cawber Frontier. In our model, it will appear as rightward shift in AP, the asset level at which individuals endogenously
move from the subsistence class to the petty commodity class.
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These two fundamental changes brought by risk have important implications for political econ-
omy. For a given initial asset distribution, the rightward shift in AP thins the ranks of those who
support Government investment in public goods. In addition, for those who remain Petty Com-
modity Producers, it reduces their material gain from policies that promote public goods. Together,
these two forces imply that a broader class of wealth distributions will not be able to endogenously
sustain inclusive growth policies. Put differently, office-seeking political entrepreneurs have little
to gain from offering public goods to a population that will remain trapped at relatively low levels
of economic well-being even after public goods are provided. Risk, especially at the levels ob-
served across wide parts of rural Africa, not only discourages investment, but also fundamentally
breaks the political-economic logic that could create and sustain inclusive growth policies.
5.2 Policy Interventions Through the Lens of Political Economy
Models, such as the one developed in this paper that indicates that initial conditions matter, are
problematic in terms of their policy implications. The Peruvian economist, Adolfo Figueroa, once
commented that Latin America needed a “refoundational shock” to reduce asset inequality so that
it could start over with different initial conditions. While the desirability and certainly political
feasibility of a refoundational shock are questionable, is it any more reasonable to think about
changing the foundational agroecological conditions across parts of Africa that trap individuals in
situations in which they are of little interest to both economic and political entrepreneurs?
Somewhat surprisingly, the answer to this question may be yes. Fueled in part by technological
innovation in the area of remote sensing, recent years have seen an outpouring of efforts to index in-
surance contracts that transfer the correlated component of risk out of African agricultural systems.
While these efforts are still largely in the proof-of-concept stage, several of them reveal the poten-
tial power of the idea. In the remote pastoral regions of Northern Kenya, a satellite-based livestock
mortality insurance contract successfully delivered payouts quickly, when and where warranted.
Initial research reported in Janzen and Carter (2013) shows that the insurance payments have in-
deed served to guard family consumption standards and to protect families from further asset loss
and decapitalization.
As described by McIntosh et al. (2013), another such effort designed a weather index insurance
contract targeted at low productivity Ethiopian grain farmers. Under cover of this contract, a large
private bank agreed to open a loan portfolio for these farmers to provide the liquidity needed to
adopt improved seeds and fertilizers. The hope is that this new source of liquidity, combined with
the risk reduction of the insurance contract would crowd-in technology uptake and, in the language
of the model here, create a transition from a subsistence to a petty commercial class.37 Research
37Insurance is costly, and the key to this and other projects is the effort to interlink insurance with credit resources
needed to simultaneously increase expected income. Michael Carter et al. (2011) analyze this interlinkage in detail.
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is still underway to determine if in fact this risk transfer contract has these desired effects. But
note that if it does, this intervention will have created a viable commercial farming class in an area
heretofore characterized by technological stagnation and low income levels.
While it is premature to declare that these efforts have succeeded in fundamentally altering
the political economic landscape in Kenya and Ethiopia, the approach taken in these and related
projects is, if nothing else, novel. With modest public investment, these projects have tried to
change the landscape for economic entrepreneurs, converting low wealth households into a bank-
able investment project. If these efforts can indeed succeed and sustain themselves, then the polit-
ical economic calculus of the sort examined here may turn in change, creating a novel variant of
the virtuous circle that underlay the East Asian Miracle a generation ago.
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A Proofs
Proposition. Provided initial assets range from zero to infinity, economies with sufficiently high
levels of public goods will exhibit all three classes. A sufficient level of public goods is
1+
cF
P
≤ (1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
[
2+ r
1+ r
[
1+θ/2
1+ r
]1/(2+r)
−1
]
.
Proof. For a Petty producer with assets such that Ki = P, say A˜P, the producer’s intertemporal
decision implies
(1− τ) A˜P =
[
1+
(1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
]
P+ cF . (17)
Since a Large producer with assets A˜P would also choose Ki = P, clearly UP > UL since cP > 0.
Using the expressions above, Petty production dominates subsistence at A˜P exactly when(
(1− τ) A˜P−P− cF
)
[(1+θ/2)/(1+ r)]1/(2+r) ≥ (1+ r)(1− τ) A˜P/(2+ r) .
With equation (17), this is equivalent to[
1+
(1+ r)(1+θ)
1+θ/2
]
P+ cF ≥ P+ cF
1− (1+ r)/(2+ r) · [(1+ r)/(1+θ/2)]1/(2+r)
,
which implies both (8) and that (1− τ) A˜P > cF so that Petty production is accessible.
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Proposition. The political interests of Large producers are purely redistributive, while Petty pro-
ducers care also about the productive benefits of public goods. Under moderate taxation:
1. dUL/dτ ≷ 0 if and only if µ ≷ Ai.
2. dUP/dτ ≥ 0 for all Ai ≥ AP.
Proof. Consider that at Ai = AP, substitution shows
dUP
dτ
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AP
=
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AP =
1+θ/2
θ/2
(θ/2)Pα−1 (Kαi /2+P
α/2)(1−α)/α c˜0i
(1+ r) c˜1i
µ−AP.
Clearly c˜0i /c˜
1
i = ((1− τ)AP−Ki− cF)/(F +Ki) decreases in Ki, so evaluating at Ki = 0 shows
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AP ≥
1+θ/2
θ/2
(θ/2)Pα−1 (Pα/2)(1−α)/α ((1− τ)AP− cF)
(1+ r)θP2−1/α
µ−AP
= [(1− (2+ r)τ)AP− cF ]/(1+ r)τ,
which is positive so long as investible period 0 assets, (1− τ)AP− cF are greater than (1+ r)τAP
as assumed. Also note that (1− τ)AP− cF > (1+ r)τAP with cF ≥ 0 implies τ ≤ 1/(2+ r), so
(1− τ)Ai− cF > (1+ r)τAi for all Ai ≥ AP. Replacing AP with Ai ≥ AP in the argument above
then gives the result.
Proposition. Under moderate taxation, increases in public goods enlarge the Petty Commercial
class relative to Subsistence and Large Commercial classes.
Proof. What is needed is to show that as τ increases, ALincreases and AP decreases. First consider
that for producers indifferent between Petty and Large production at asset level AL, Equations (11)
and (6) imply the benefits of Petty production dominate as taxes increase (dUP/dτ ≥ dUL/dτ) iff
(µ−AL)
(
1+θ/2
1+ r
)1/(2+r)
≤
(
1+θ/2
θ/2
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
µ−AL
)(
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+ r
)1/(2+r)
. (18)
Further reduction shows Equation (18) holds exactly when
(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1/2+r[
1−
(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1+r/2+r ∂F/∂P
θ/2
]
≤
[(
1+θ/2
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
)1/2+r
−1
]
AL
µ
. (19)
At AL, a Petty producer would necessarily use the saved fixed costs cP from not becoming a Large
producer to invest in assets Ki > P, it follows that ∂F/∂Ki < θ/2 < ∂F/∂P, so the RHS of
Equation (19) is positive, while the LHS is negative. Therefore dUP/dτ ≥ dUL/dτ at AL, so the
Petty class expands at the expense of the Large class. Similarly, for producers indifferent between
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Petty and Subsistence production at asset level AP, Equations (11) and (6) imply that dUS/dτ ≤ 0
while dUP/dτ ≥ 0 under moderate taxation. Therefore as taxes increase, Petty producers expand
at the expense of the Subsistence producers.
Lemma. d2UP/d2τ < 0 for all Petty producers as long as the marginal return on public goods at
AL is less than 4
√
1− τ .
Proof. From the envelope theorem, dUP/dτ =
[
1/c˜0i ∂F/∂P/c˜
1
i
]
·
[
−Ai P/τ
]
and therefore
d2UP
d2τ
=−
[
−Ai
P/τ
]T [ (
dc˜0i /dAi
)
/
(
c˜0i
)2 (dc˜0i /dP)/(c˜0i )2(
dc˜0i /dP
)
/
(
c˜0i
)2 d (∂F/∂P/c˜1i )/dP
][
−Ai
P/τ
]
.
Further reduction shows that
d2UP
d2τ
=− 1(
c˜0i
)2
[
−Ai
P/τ
]T  dc˜0i /dAi dc˜0i /dP
dc˜0i /dP
(1+r)2
(1+∂F/∂Ki)
2
[(
dc˜1i /dP
) · ∂F/∂P− c˜1i · ∂ 2F/∂ 2P]
[ −Ai
P/τ
]
,
so that d2UP/d2τ < 0 iff
dc˜0i
dAi
A2i +
(1+ r)2
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2
[
dc˜1i
dP
· ∂F/∂P− c˜1i · ∂ 2F/∂ 2P
](
P
τ
)2
>
(
dc˜0i
dP
)2
Ai
P
τ
. (20)
The LHS of Equation (20), is positive which follows from
dc˜0i
dAi
= (1− τ)− dKi
dAi
= (1− τ) (1+ r)− ∂
2F/∂ 2Ki · c˜0i /(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
(2+ r)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki · c˜0i /(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
> (1− τ) (1+ r)
(2+ r)
,
and noting ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki,∂ 2F/∂ 2P < 0 < ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki, combined with
dc˜1i
dP
· ∂F/∂P = ∂F/∂P
1+ r
[
∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i +
[
∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki− (1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
] dKi
dP
]
= ∂F/∂P
[
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki +
1+ ∂F/∂Ki− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
∂F/∂P
]
>
(∂F/∂P)2
2+ r
.
Thus, for Equation (20) to hold, it is sufficient that
(1− τ) (1+ r)
(2+ r)
A2i +
(1+ r)2
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2
(∂F/∂P)2
2+ r
(
P
τ
)2
≥
(
dc˜0i
dP
)2
Ai
P
τ
. (21)
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The RHS of Equation (21) is also bounded above by
(
(1+r)∂F/∂P
(2+r)(1+∂F/∂Ki)−∂2F/∂2Ki
)2
AiP/τ because
dc˜0i
dP
=
(1+ r)∂F/∂P− ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i
(2+ r)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)− ∂ 2F/∂ 2Ki
=
(θ/2)(1+ r)
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
K1−αi (K
α
i /2+P
α/2)+α (θ/2)(Kαi /2+P
α/2)1/α − (1−α)(Ki/2)
K1−αi P1−α [(2+ r)(1+D1F)−D11F ]
(
Kαi /2+Pα/2
)(2α−1)/α > 0
and ∂ 2F/∂P∂Ki · c˜0i > 0. Therefore to show Equation (21), it is sufficient to show
(1− τ)(2+ r)A2i (1+ ∂F/∂Ki)2 /(1+ r)+(2+ r)(∂F/∂P)2 (P/τ)2 ≥ (∂F/∂P)2 AiP/τ.
This holds exactly when[
(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)
√
(1− τ)(2+ r)/(1+ r)Ai− ∂F/∂P ·
√
(2+ r)(P/τ)
]2
≥
[
(∂F/∂P)2−2(∂F/∂P)(1+ ∂F/∂Ki)(2+ r)
√
(1− τ)/(1+ r)
]
Ai (P/τ) ,
which implies the result.
Proposition. Under moderate taxation and (16), increases in expected public goods crowd in
delivered public goods.
Proof. Recall the first order condition for interior equilibria of Equation (14).38 Holding the polit-
ically determined level of public goods (say P) constant, now consider what happens in (14) when
the level of expected public goods (say P∗) increases. Since AL and AP are functions of expected
public goods only, differentiating Equation (14) with respect to P∗, we have
ψ
dσL
dP∗
∫ ∞
AL
(µ−Ai) dULdAi dA(i)+ψ
dσP
dP∗
∫ AL
AP
(
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2
µ−Ai
)
dUP
dAi
dA(i) (22)
− (1+ψσL) (µ−AL)
dUL
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AL
dAL
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AL) (23)
+(1+ψσP)
(
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2
µ−AL
)
dUP
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AL
dAL
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AL) (24)
− (1+ψσP)
(
∂F/∂P
1+ ∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2
µ−AP
)
dUP
dAi
∣∣∣∣
Ai=AP
dAP
dP∗
A′ (Ai = AP) (25)
By breaking down Equations (22-25), we will show that the entire expression is positive. We first
claim that (22) must be positive. This is because, under moderate taxes, the second term on the
38At the unique corner solution of P = 0, clearly no change in public good provision occurs until an interior equi-
librium of P > 0 binds, so public good provision weakly increases.
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RHS of (14) is positive and dσP/dP∗ > 0. Consequently, the first term on the LHS of (14) must
be positive and dσL/dP∗ < 0, so (22) is positive. Second, (25) is positive because dAP/dP∗ < 0,
clearly dUP/dAi > 0 and under moderate taxes,
(
∂F/∂P
1+∂F/∂Ki
1+θ/2
θ/2 µ−AP
)
> 0. Finally, (22-25) is
then positive if (23-24) can be shown to be positive, which holds exactly when
(1+ψσP) · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > (1+ψσL) · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL .
Since Proposition 5 has shown dUP/dτ|Ai=AL ≥ dUL/dτ|Ai=AL , a sufficient condition for (22-25)
to be positive is σP · dUP/dτ|Ai=AL > σL · dUL/dτ|Ai=AL .
Since (22-25) is positive, if (14) decreases in P, then increases in expected public goods P∗
increase public goods delivered in equilibrium. This follows if d2UL/d2τ < 0 and d2UP/d2τ < 0.
It can be shown directly that d2UL/d2τ < 0,39 and the Lemma above shows d2UP/d2τ < 0.
B Numerical Details
The numerical simulations in the main text have the same preferences, production parameters
and mean asset level of 260, but vary in the distribution of assets. The low inequality economy
has an initial asset distribution that is inverse Pareto of Pr(A≤ a) = (a/400)1.85 while the high
inequality economy has an initial asset distribution satisfying Pr(A≤ a) = (a/1000).351. The latter
distribution is based on the distribution of land ownership in Nicaragua of the 1970s.
The discount rate in both economies was taken as 1/1.1 for an interest rate of 10%. The
common production parameters are α = 1/5 and θ = .8 (so that the return to F in the absence of
public goods is .025). The fixed costs of production are given by cF = 25 and cP = 45. In the
political simulations, the density of party preference shocks corresponds to ψ = 4.
C Expected Electoral Outcomes and Equilibrium Policy
Given these economic fundamentals, how will electoral politics work? Figure 7 shows the likely
political fate of the reformist Green party for different public good platforms (shown on the hori-
zontal axis) in opposition to a P= 0 status quo party. The solid (red) line shows expected net votes
for the Green Party minus votes for the Red Party including both informed and uninformed voters,
when classes are formed expecting P = 0. Similarly, the long-dashed (blue) lines shows the net
voting preference of informed voters. The short-dashed line (green) graphs informed voter support
when classes are formed based on expected public goods P > 0 as on the horizontal axis. All net
vote percentages are displayed as a fraction of the overall population of the society.
39Specifically, d2UL/d2τ =− [−(1+ r)(1+θ/2)Ai+ r (1+θ/2)µ]2 /
[
(1+ r)(1+θ/2) c˜0i + r (1+θ/2)τµ
]2
.
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Figure 7: Net Votes for Reform Party
(a) High inequality (b) Low Inequality
We now consider politics and policy under the low and high inequality scenarios displayed
above in Figure 4. The high inequality scenario approximates Latin American levels of agrarian
inequality, with the wealthiest 20% of the population controlling 80% of the wealth. The low
inequality scenario approximates an East Asian scenario in which an asset ownership ceiling has
been imposed (akin to what happened in many East Asian economies during the World War II era).
Under the high inequality scenario displayed in panel (a) of Figure 7, both informed and total net
votes for the reform party are overwhelmingly negative, especially for small steps away from the
P = 0 status quo. It is of course the money the informed voters (large scale commercial producers
in this case) that drive the votes of the large mass of uninformed voters. Even if the reform party
radically promises a policy of relatively high taxes and public good provision, net votes still remain
negative. Wealth inequality in this case continues to drive politics even though more individuals
become informed and interested in supporting public good policies.
It is important stress here that politics are here being driven by the same liquidity constraints
that drive production choices. Individuals must self-finance their own investment through reduced
consumption. Similarly, the assumed borrowing constraint prevents voters from borrowing to fi-
nance the election of a party that would improve their economic well-being.
Panel b of Figure 7 displays expected electoral outcomes under the low initial inequality sce-
nario. Here, a reform party promise of modest amounts of public good will meet with neither
support nor opposition by any informed group. Elections should thus be a toss-up. However, a
reform party promise of more significant amounts of public goods (P≈ 30) begins to garner some
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informed support. A promise of quite high levels of tax-financed public goods (P > 100) gar-
ners the greatest amount of informed political support. While there are still taxpayers in the low
inequality economy that will pay more in taxes then they receive in public goods, the returns to
public goods are extraordinarily high for this class of voters as public capital augments the pro-
ductivity of private capital. These groups thus find it in their interest to support reform parties and
policies for relatively high public expenditure levels.
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